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ABSTRACT. This paper analyses the republican notion of non-domination
from the viewpoint of individual dignity. It determines the aspect of indi-
vidual dignity that republicans are concerned with and scrutinises how it is
safeguarded by non-domination. I argue that the notion of non-domination
as it is formulated by Pettit contains a number of ambiguities that need to be
addressed. I discuss these ambiguities and argue for speciﬁc solutions that
place great importance on a persons moral beliefs and his status as a moral
being amongst others. Furthermore, I argue that the impunity interpretation
is to be favoured over the immunity interpretation of non-domination.
I show that whilst these solutions accord well with many important
republican tenets, they have other implications that contradict known
republican positions. In particular, I show there is both room and a need for
retributivism within republicanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of dignity is acknowledged by most important
philosophical doctrines (with the possible exception of utili-
tarianism). It is also asserted in a number of key political
documents (e.g. the UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Geneva Conventions and the German constitution).
Nonetheless, even though papers and arguments that rely on or
use the notion of dignity are plentiful in law, political science
and philosophy, surprisingly little conceptual analysis of this
key notion has been published (exceptions include Meyer
(1989), Kolnai (1995) and Shultziner (2003)). Concepts typi-
cally associated with dignity include autonomy, freedom, the
now somewhat outmoded notion of honour, integrity and self-
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respect. The notion also caries a certain air of majesty, and can
in some ways be connected to the notions of control, (self-)
mastery and sovereignty.
Clearly, it is a notion of great importance, but a multifaceted
one. Rather than trying to develop an all-encompassing
account at once, it therefore seems appropriate to take a more
piecemeal approach. In this paper I concentrate on one such
particular aspect of dignity. This aspect, which focuses on a
persons ability to resist intrusions into his own affairs, is of
particular relevance in republican thought, such as the writings
of Quentin Skinner (1998, 2006) and Philip Pettit (1997, 2001a,
2002). I therefore use the term republican dignity to refer to
this aspect of dignity. After introducing the notion of non-
domination as it has been advocated by Pettit (section II),
I scrutinise it in its relation to individual dignity (section III).
I argue, however, that the way non-domination has been
explicated by Pettit contains at least two ambiguities that need
to be addressed – the precise meaning of avowed or readily
avowable interests (section IV) and what it means to be forced
to track these (section V). I defend speciﬁc interpretations of
these ambiguities, and conclude the paper by discussing their
implications (section VI). Many of these accord well with
familiar republican positions, such as the importance of dis-
course and contestability, but some other implications are less
uncontroversial. In particular, I argue that retributivism should
be regarded as an essential aspect of a republican criminal
justice system – a result that directly contradicts Pettits own
position (Pettit 1997; Braithwaite and Pettit 1990).
Focusing on one particular aspect of dignity has a number of
advantages, the most important being that it makes the subject
matter manageable. Furthermore, analysing different aspects of
the notion in turn makes possible to see where the difﬁculties lie
in a more encompassing analysis of the concept. To some
degree, different aspects of the notion of dignity may ‘‘pull’’ in
different directions, or have seemingly opposite implications
that will have to be reconciled. It should also be mentioned,
though, that focusing on one such aspect means that the
analysis may have to depend in part on certain other aspects of
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the notion of dignity that have not yet been analysed or sufﬁ-
ciently developed. In such partial analyses it is often unavoid-
able that a certain amount of vagueness is introduced, which
may cloud the discussion somewhat. For instance, when one
focuses on the ability to resist intrusions into ones affairs, this
only seems relevant if it is assumed beforehand that one wants
to resist certain such instances. Some people, such as happy
slaves and human doormats, may lack this inclination to resist.
Such cases are indubitably problematic when it comes to the
dignity of the individuals concerned. However, it is not the
speciﬁc aspect of dignity that is the subject of this paper which
is at stake in such cases. Rather, it seems that this is a matter of
the aspect of dignity that connects it to (proper) self-respect.
Where such dependencies occur in my analysis, however, I have
tried to make it explicit in the text.
II. NON-DOMINATION
The republican notion of non-domination is usually analysed in
relation to freedom (see e.g. Pettit 1997, 2001a, 2002 and
Skinner Skinner 1998, 2006). In this paper, however, I scruti-
nise it in its relation to individual dignity. Modern republicans
such as Pettit and Skinner have themselves instituted this focus
on freedom by claiming that theirs is a notion of freedom that is
distinct from (what they call) the liberal notion of freedom.
This latter notion equates freedom with the absence of inter-
ference, and the republican claim that this notion is inadequate
has prompted a vigorous reply by its advocates (see, for
instance, Carter 1999, 2008, Kramer 2003 and Goodin 2003).
However, many of the republicans arguments in favour of their
notion of freedom, explicated by Pettit through his notion of
non-domination, also reveal a clear concern for individual
dignity. The main assumption underlying this paper is that
republicans care about freedom as non-domination because
they care about individual dignity. In this paper I try to identify
just what notion or aspect of individual dignity they are trying
to safeguard through their advocacy of non-domination. I am
thus not directly concerned with the debate between republi-
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cans and their adversaries on freedom and non-domination. As
the notion of non-domination is most thoroughly discussed
within this debate, though, it does form the starting point of my
analysis. I am concerned with this debate on freedom, however,
only insofar as it provides insights into the republican view of
dignity.
The republican notion of freedom as non-domination is a
purely social notion of freedom. Whether someone is free or
not, is – to republicans – determined completely by the relation
in which he stands to others. A person is dominated, according
to Pettit, if someone else holds arbitrary power of interference
over him, and this arbitrary power Pettit deﬁnes as follows
(2002, pp. 341–342):
[S]omeone has an arbitrary power of interference in the affairs of another so
far as they have a power of interference that is not forced to track the
avowed or readily avowable interests of the other […].
A person is said to be free in the republican sense if no-one
holds such arbitrary power over him, i.e. if he is not dominated.
According to republicans such as Skinner and Pettit, the
standard, liberal notion of freedom as non-interference has two
major deﬁciencies, which the republican notion of freedom,
with its focus on the possibility of arbitrary interference, is said
to solve. First, as the liberal notion of freedom holds a person
to be free as long as he is not interfered with, it disregards the
fact that a persons freedom can be curtailed as soon as a
person can be interfered with, even if the person who could do
so chooses not to. Advocates of the liberal notion of freedom
disregard the debilitating eﬀects of the mere possibility that one
may be interfered with, even if this possibility is not actualised,
or so republicans argue. If you know another person has the
ability to interfere with you at her leisure, this creates a great
level of uncertainty on your part. You will not be able to rely
on your present abilities, as the other persons possible inter-
ference hangs over you like a sword of Damocles. This uncer-
tainty is disabling enough in itself, as it hampers you setting and
pursuing long term goals, but it also gives you a strong
incentive to try and inﬂuence the wielder of this arbitrary
power. You will, for instance, become very careful about your
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choice of action because you do not want to engage in activities
on which your dominator frowns. You will not do many of the
things you could do, just because you want to maintain her
good graces. Furthermore, in seeking her favour, you may be
forced to engage in rather nauseating feats of sycophancy.
Advocates of the liberal notion of freedom have challenged the
view that their notion of freedom disregards these aspects (see
e.g. Carter 1999, 2008 and Goodin 2003), but for the purposes
of this paper it is more important to note that most, perhaps
even all of these criticisms are just as problematic when
regarded from the point of view of individual dignity as they
are from the point of view of liberty. Moreover, it is not just
because of the eﬀects it has on individual behaviour that
republicans are concerned with non-domination. What you
will, can, or cannot do when you are in such a position is
important enough, but such issues are derivative and second-
ary. The primary problem, according to republicans, is that
when one is dominated such issues are up to someone else. A
dominated person is not his own master, and being dominated
is therefore humiliating in and of itself.
Pettits choice of words shows a clear concern with individ-
ual dignity: people who are dominated are demeaned by their
vulnerability (Pettit 1997, p. 5), and non-domination is to be
furthered because it allows people to look the other in the eye
and ensures that they do not have to bow and scrape (Pettit
1997, p. 87). The historical excerpts Pettit cites often also
combine the importance of liberty with a clear concern for
dignity, e.g.: An exterior Power claims a Right to govern us,
and have for a number of Years been levying an illegal tax on
us; whereby we are degraded from the rank of Free Subjects to
the despicable condition of Slaves (cited in Pettit 1997, p. 34,
emphases added). The republican concern with dignity is shown
most explicitly, though, in the following citation (Pettit 2002,
p. 351): The terrible evil brought about by domination […] is
that it deprives a person of the ability to command attention
and respect and so of his or her standing among persons.
Domination robs people of their dignity.
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There is a second way in which the republican notion of
non-domination differs from the liberal notion of freedom as
absence of interference, which is also highly relevant to
understanding their concern for dignity. To republicans the
nature of an interfering act is vital, as they claim only arbitrary
interference limits your freedom. Therefore, some interfering
actions – those of the non-arbitrary kind – do not curtail your
freedom.1 This raises some interesting conceptual issues
regarding the adequacy of the republican notion of freedom as
non-domination as a freedom conception (see e.g. Carter 2008),
but this paper focuses exclusively on individual dignity. I shall
therefore not address such questions, but if I am correct in my
assumption that republicans care about non-domination
because they care about individual dignity, then such non-
arbitrary interferences should be unproblematic when regarded
from the viewpoint of dignity as well. What exactly makes an
instance of interference arbitrary or non-arbitrary is of course a
most pressing matter in this regard, and the following sections
are dedicated to addressing this question.
III. NON-DOMINATION AND DIGNITY
Before we can proceed we need to understand exactly how
(non-)domination affects a persons dignity. As the quotations
from Pettit show, a fundamental aspect has to do with the
ability to resist intrusions by others. To be dominated is to be
vulnerable; if you are dominated someone else can do with you
as she wishes – at least with respect to speciﬁc areas of your
affairs. To be non-dominated, therefore, means that one is able
to resist those intrusions into ones affairs that one rejects.
What republicans have in mind when they seek to free domi-
nated people from their yoke is a form of empowerment. One
1 Not all republicans hold quite such a black-and-white view. Skinner, for
instance, is of the opinion that to be free requires that one is free in both the
republican and the liberal sense. Pettit, by contrast, prioritises the republi-
can notion of freedom (Pettit 2002).
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should be able to command attention and respect (Pettit 2002,
p. 351, emphasis added). In some ways this concern is similar to
Feinbergs when he stresses the importance of a concept of
rights (1970). Having a concept of rights is vital, so Feinberg
claims, because it enables people to demand their due, rather
than request it. However, while having a notion of rights may
be a necessary condition for being able to stand up for oneself it
certainly is not suﬃcient. One must also be able to assert ones
rights if one thinks they are being violated. A dominated person
lacks this ability, not because he lacks a notion of his rights but
because the power of his dominator acts like a knife to his
throat.
It should be stressed, though, that the empowerment non-
domination provides is primarily a defensive ability. It enables
persons to ward off intrusions into their affairs if they choose
to, but it does not necessarily provide them with abilities to
pursue other goals, while it certainly should not enable them
to subjugate others. According to Goodin, a critic of repub-
licanism, the republican ideal (both in its historic and more
modern forms) is the sturdy man of honor, relying only on
the strength of his own arms (2003, p. 66, referring to Slote
1993). Formulating the neo-republican ideal so directly in
terminology that belongs to the republican thought of centu-
ries ago is probably something of a caricature, but like all
good caricatures, it contains an important element of truth.
Republicans clearly feel that as an individual you should have
the ability to ward oﬀ intrusions into your aﬀairs purely on
the ground that they are your aﬀairs and that you do not want
these intrusions. This is indeed an important ability. It is hard
to conceive of a society taking the rights and status of indi-
viduals as moral beings seriously if there are no areas in which
the individual alone gets to decide whether someone else may
interfere with his activities; and when people do get to inter-
fere with you in ways you regard as objectionable, and you
are powerless to do anything about it, this powerlessness does
aﬀect your dignity and standing. Having to stand idly by as
people bulldoze your rights as you see them is profoundly
humiliating.
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As the republican notion of dignity is concerned with a social
aspect of dignity, it is concerned with a persons status amongst
others (now usually assumed to be one of equality). Whereas
the notion of status is purely a matter of ones position within
society, the notion of dignity is more complicated as it also
involves a highly personal aspect. The social aspect of a per-
sons dignity is not only concerned with the status he has, but
also with the way he deals with the implications this brings with
it. It means, for instance, that one has to live up to the duties
that come with ones status. What is more important for the
analysis of the republican notion of dignity, though, is that a
persons status has consequences for how others must, may,
and in particular may not, behave towards him. A digniﬁed
persons role is not purely passive here. As Pettits insistence on
the importance of being able to command respect and standing
shows, a persons dignity requires him to take an active stance.
If a person wrongfully intrudes into your aﬀairs it is not just his
intrusion that oﬀends; it also constitutes an aﬀront to your
dignity because you take oﬀence.2 Of course, your dignity is
also at issue when you fail to take oﬀence when you ought to –
as the aforementioned example of the human doormat shows –
but this is not the aspect of personal dignity with which non-
domination is directly concerned. The republican notion of
dignity emphasises the importance of this active element in that
it enables people to respond to hostile intrusions, but it is not
immediately concerned with the problem that some people may
still fail to make use of this ability even if they have it. It is
important for people, if they are to be able to regard themselves
as full, actively participating members of a society, that they
2 Duﬀ and Marshall (2006) discuss a number of diﬀerent ways in which a
person can take oﬀence. The kind of oﬀence I am discussing here falls under
what they call mediated oﬀence resulting from the violation of a moral
standard. The way I use taking oﬀence is slightly more restrictive than the
way they use it, however, as it not only requires that a person judges some
standard or value that [he] take[s] seriously (Duﬀ and Marshall 2006, p. 60)
to be violated, but also that he considers himself wronged by this violation
(see also footnote 8).
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can take oﬀence when they feel they are wronged, and make
sure this wrong to their person is addressed. 3 People who are
dominated lack this power. As a result, this vulnerability makes
it impossible for them to feel secure about their position in
society so they cannot consider themselves a full member of it,
experiencing society in terms of oppression or alienation.4
Those critical of the republican ideal of non-domination may
point out, however, that there is far more to dignity than this
ability to ward off or respond to unwelcome intrusions into
ones affairs. One can tarnish ones dignity even if one does
have this ability, as when one uses it to keep others from
interfering when one engages in self-degrading activities, for
instance. Furthermore, as Goodin points out in relation to
3 The ability or power to take oﬀence, as I use it, is thus not just a power
of judgment (the judgment that one is wronged by another), but the ability
to act on that judgment and have the wrong addressed. Whether one gen-
uinely has such an ability is both dependent on the personal costs involved
in taking such action (which must not be prohibitive) and on the prospects
of achieving what one sets out to do. To some degree the republican call for
empowerment is similar to points made by advocates of positive liberty and
autonomy (such as Raz 1986, Taylor 1997, Rawls 1999, ONeill 1989,
Crocker 1980, Dworkin 1988). There are, however, important diﬀerences
from such accounts, which typically focus on people setting and pursuing
their own goals or way of life, or living according to rules and principles
they set for themselves. Non-domination is not focused on ones ability to
choose and pursue goals, but exclusively at the relation in which one stands
to others. Furthermore, a person who stands up for himself and resists
intrusions into his aﬀairs is not just asserting certain principles or rules for
himself (the Kantian notion of self-legislation); he is ﬁrst and foremost
asserting that the rules and principles he asserts are binding on others.
4 As Goodins characterisation of the republican ideal shows, the notion
of republican dignity is in some aspects very close to the notion of honour.
There are diﬀerences between these notions, though. I do not wish to go into
the details of the notion of honour here, but one of the important diﬀerences
between the republican notion of dignity and honour is that the latter deals
exactly with the question of when a person ought to take oﬀence, whereas
the republican notion of dignity is solely concerned with the ability to assert
oneself if one does so. Many nowadays regard the notion of honour as
outmoded, but one way of interpreting the importance of republican dignity
is that it enables individuals to uphold their honour. A more modern
interpretation is that it enables people to uphold their place in society as a
moral being amongst others.
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honour codes and shame societies, such an ability may be
misused if one has ﬂawed beliefs about which intrusions are
legitimate and which are not (and which responses are then
called for), so that one takes offence when one ought not (see
also Meyer 1989). This is undoubtedly true, and republicans
have readily admitted that their call for non-domination pre-
supposes that people entertain a somewhat adequate view of
how they should be treated by others and how they should
comport themselves. As Pettit puts it: Embrace the life of a sect
who abase themselves before some self-appointed guru and you
will see little in the ideal of freedom as non-domination (Pettit
1997, p. 97). But it should be emphasised that the fact that such
an ability may be misused (or fail to be used) by persons who
lack a proper sense of self-respect or who entertain ﬂawed
moral or political beliefs in no way disqualiﬁes it as an
important ability for those who do not. The republican notion
of dignity certainly does not capture all there is to say about
dignity, but it does nonetheless identify an important aspect of
the concept in its emphasis on the ability to respond to intru-
sions into ones own aﬀairs, and it is this particular aspect of an
individuals dignity with which non-domination is directly
concerned.
IV. DIGNITY AND INTERFERENCE
Thus far, I have described the ideal of republican dignity
mainly in terms of an individuals defensive ability. What is also
clear from Pettits deﬁnition of non-domination, however, is
that there are intrusions into a persons affairs against which
such a defensive ability is not required. If someone interferes
with you, or has the power to interfere with you, in a way that
must track your avowed or readily avowable interests, this
does not cause affront to your status and dignity, or so Pettit
claims (Pettit 2002, p. 350). However, whether such interference
is truly unproblematic when it comes to your dignity depends
on how you interpret avowed or readily avowable interests. As
the following shows, this notion is ambiguous and, conse-
quently, one can meet the requirements of this deﬁnition whilst
still causing aﬀront (and hence one can cause aﬀront even if one
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is forced to meet these conditions). To solve this problem
I argue for a reformulation of the notion of non-domination
that is partially derived from the way Pettit described the no-
tion of non-domination in his earlier works.
One kind of well-intended interference that is incompatible
with a persons dignity is, of course, paternalistic interference.
Few things are as demeaning as someone else getting to decide
unilaterally what is good for you and interfere with you
accordingly. At ﬁrst glance, Pettits formulation seems to rule
out paternalistic interference, however, as he demands that the
interests a person should be forced to track when she gets to
interfere with you are not merely your interests as she sees
them, but the interests you perceive as such (i.e. your avowed
or readily avowable interests). As the following example shows,
though, this requirement is still insuﬃcient to prevent the
possibility of humiliating and oﬀensive intrusions. Suppose
I am a smoker. Suppose furthermore, that even though I reg-
ularly indulge in this habit, I do not deny the harmful eﬀects
this has on my health, so that I avow, or would avow if so
asked, that smoking is indeed bad for me and harmful to my
interests. According to Pettits formulation of non-domination,
this avowal would provide someone else with suﬃcient legiti-
mation to interfere in my smoking.5 Yet I somehow suspect
that if you were to go out on the street armed with a fully
loaded water pistol looking for people who are about to light
up and prevent them from harming their readily avowable
interests, you would encounter a considerable amount of
righteous indignation. Furthermore, this indignation is not
based on the fact that their interests are harmed, but on the fact
that they feel you have no right to interfere with them in that
manner and that, when you do so, you are grossly oﬀending
them. When pressed, they may even agree that your interfer-
5 At least, just as long as the means by which she does this are not more
detrimental to my interests than my smoking.
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ence is in their best interests, while nevertheless maintaining
their rejection of your interference.6 In this way, it therefore
seems that the deﬁnition of non-domination as it stands is
insuﬃcient to safeguard a persons dignity because arguably it
would allow for this kind of interference. After all, you may
quite plausibly argue that your squirting interference is tracking
their avowed and certainly their readily avowable interests, as
they have avowed that smoking is harming their interests and
all you have done is prevent this harm from occurring.7 I doubt
that this is what Pettit has in mind, so a speciﬁcation of what
exactly is meant by interests is called for.
In his earlier works (e.g. Pettit 1997) Pettit did not use the
deﬁnition of non-domination we are using here, but formulated
domination in terms of interference that does not track your
interests and ideas (my emphasis). Whether or not this change
is intended to be a signiﬁcant change to the concept of non-
domination is unclear, but either way it raises the question of
what we are to make of the and ideas part of this earlier
formulation. One possibility is that the later formulation uses a
broader notion of interests, which regards ones ideas as part of
ones interests. The other possibility is that Pettit deliberately
distinguishes between interests and ideas, but that he no longer
regards ideas as relevant to domination, having added the
phrase avowed or readily avowable to prevent certain
instances of paternalism. Both interpretations are problematic,
though, because, as the remainder of this section shows, whe-
ther or not an interfering act constitutes an aﬀront to ones
dignity depends primarily on ones ideas and much less on ones
interests.
6 It is important to stress that the crucial point of this example is that even
those smokers who agree that your interference is tracking their avowed or
readily avowable interests can legitimately take oﬀence because of your
interference. Of course there will be smokers who highly value the activity of
smoking for some reason or other, so that they will avow that being allowed
to smoke is in their true interests and thus reject the interference on those
grounds, but that is beside the point here.
7 I am assuming you are a perfect shot, so that their interests are in no
further way aﬀected by your interference other than that they are unable to
light up.
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If we take the latter interpretation and deﬁne interest in
a narrower sense, problems like the smoking example are
unavoidable. For interference to be compatible with your dignity
it has to be such that it does not cause affront, while its tracking
your interests – even interests you avow – is not always sufﬁcient
to avoid affront. This is so, for instance, because one may hold
dearly to the option that one can act against ones own interests
as thus conceived. It may be argued, for example, that if you
interfere in line with my (avowed) interests, you still deny me the
choice to do as I see ﬁt. It may be that I then – due to your
interference – do what I think I should have chosen to do any-
way, but in an important way the choice is no longer mine. Your
interference has robbed me of this choice, and this choice itself
may be important to me. I may, for example, greatly value the
freedom to smoke independently of having any desire to smoke
(cf. Carter 1999, pp. 41–60). This argument is intuitively most
plausible if I would indeed have chosen the action you now
forcedme to take, but it holds even if I know Iwould have chosen
the option you took fromme. I may hold such a choice dear even
if it leads me astray. This is not because the choice necessarily
enables me to pursue my interests better (clearly, if I know I shall
make the wrong choice it doesnt), but simply because I regard
the choice as mine to make (as I think is the case for most
smokers who object to being prevented from smoking: their
objections have far less to do with their interests than with what
they see as their right – even if it is a right to harm themselves).
If an instance of interference can cause affront by the mere
fact that it takes from you a choice you regard as yours to
make, this shows it is primarily your beliefs on which choices
are yours to make that should be tracked if we want to make
sure that an instance of interference is unproblematic from the
standpoint of republican dignity. One can quite legitimately
take offence purely based on these beliefs, without ever having
to refer to ones interests. Of course, one could argue that in
such cases ones true avowed interests are the ability to choose
whether or not to smoke, and not not smoking. Even if this is
so, however, one still has to grant that the term interests is
ambiguous and confusing. Furthermore, as it is your ideas on
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what choices are yours to make that make this your true
avowed interests, we may in such cases argue that interference
should track your ideas just as well as we may argue that it
should track your interests. Moreover, it should be noted that
identifying a persons true avowed interests with having choice
as such comes very close to a straightforward appeal for neg-
ative, liberal freedom; as republicans are adamant that they are
not arguing for pure negative liberty, it seems unlikely that this
interpretation is to be favoured.
One may go even further, though, arguing that interests in
the narrow sense may not be directly relevant at all when it
comes to preventing affront. Suppose, for instance, that on
some faraway island an imminent natural disaster threatens the
lives of the local population. Suppose furthermore that you
neither have, nor ever will have any dealings with these people.
Your government decides to help these islanders, but in order
to fund the rescue effort they have to levy a substantial extra
tax. This extra tax prevents you from engaging in certain
activities dear to you. In such a case it is quite plausible that
you will regard this tax as going against your avowed interests,
and it obviously interferes with you, but you do not feel this
interference causes affront to your person. You may feel, for
instance, that the governments rescue efforts legitimise this
harm to your interests. Of course it may also be the case that
you do regard such a government intrusion into your ﬁnancial
affairs a grossly illegitimate act of government interference if
your beliefs are that governments have no standing to enforce
such activities – for instance because you feel this should be left
to voluntary contributions. This again reinforces the point: it is
only your ideas and moral beliefs about the interference, and
not your interests, that determine whether an instance of
interference can cause affront to you.
Of course I do not seek to claim that ones interests and ones
ideas are completely independent. Quite often ones interests
will shape ones ideas, and ones ideas may in turn inﬂuence
what one regards as ones interests. The arguments above do
show, however, that when it comes to dignity it is ﬁrst and
foremost your beliefs and ideas that those who are in a position
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to interfere with you should be forced to track and not your
interests. Of course it is possible to use the term interests in a
broad way so that it is taken to include such beliefs. But if it is
ones ideas on the interference that determine whether or not it
constitutes an affront to ones dignity, then referring to an
ambiguous notion such as interests is at best highly undesirable
as it only serves to elicit confusion. To refer to ones ideas about
the interference has the added advantage that the manner in
which the interference came about can be accommodated, too.
To refer to interests suggests that all that matters, if we are to
judge the possible dominating nature of an instance of inter-
ference, is the ultimate effect of the interference. But your
personal dignity may be affected by the way the interference is
implemented, as well as by the identity of the interferer.
Someone with whom you have a close personal relationship, for
instance, or those whom you regard as legitimate authorities on
the issue at hand may interfere with your affairs in certain ways
without causing affront, where there would be great affront if
some random stranger acted that way. If we take a persons
ideas on the interference as the guiding principle, rather than
the vaguer notion of his interests, it is immediately clear that we
can take this into account.
We are now in a position to specify the notion of domination
in such a way that non-domination does indeed exclude the
kinds of affront to a persons dignity that concern republicans
(and avoid a source of substantial confusion) by emphasising
the part of Pettits earlier formulation that underlines the
importance of a persons ideas on the interference in his affairs:
a person B is non-dominated if there is no person (or institu-
tion) A that has the power to interfere in the affairs of
B without being forced to track Bs moral views on that
interference.8 This reformulation clearly stresses the subjective
8 It should be mentioned that the moral beliefs of B to which we are
referring here concern only his beliefs about how he is to be treated. It is
possible that B regards instances of interference as wrongful for reasons that
have nothing to do with him or his views on his status as a person. If this is
the case, then he still remains undominated even though his moral beliefs are
in a way not tracked. The notion of dignity that republicans are concerned
with is in a way highly personal: it is between you and your interferer.
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element of dignity. Obviously, this will lead to a number of
complications – more on this later – but it does help solve
another problem. In the previous formulation, what constitutes
a persons own aﬀairs was quite unclear. Now we are focusing
on the judgment of the dominated person about the interfer-
ence it is clear that we should focus on the persons own aﬀairs
as he sees them: republican dignity can then be conceptualised
as the ability to ward oﬀ, or respond adequately to, treatment
one considers wrongful to ones person.9
This formulation of non-domination refers to a persons
moral views rather than their ideas in general, as ones moral
views determine whether or not one deems it proper to take
oﬀence. If we were to use a more general notion of personal
opinion, by for instance excluding any interference one does
not want in some sense, we would fail to capture the speciﬁc
poignancy of the intrusions with which republicans are con-
cerned. The mere fact that someone is subjected to unwelcome
interference is not enough to cause an aﬀront to his dignity and
status. Unwelcome events (interferences or otherwise) are a fact
of life, but do not as such inﬂict the injury that is done when
people are treated in a way they deem wrongful to their per-
son.10 A persons moral beliefs about how he is to be treated are
a diﬀerent matter, however. These beliefs are vital to allow him
to regard himself as a moral being amongst others and to
consider himself a full member of the society in which he lives,
rather than an outsider. If you are subjected to interference you
deem wrongful to your person, your status as a moral being is
at issue, as it is your moral beliefs that are neglected in a
directly personal way; such an insulting intrusion cuts much
deeper and causes injury to a person at a much more funda-
mental level than merely being subjected to an unwelcome
instance of interference (Pettit 1997, p. 84).
9 Exactly what constitutes an adequate response, of course, depends on
the concrete intrusion and the circumstances in which it occurs.
10 Of course, some people may claim that nothing may be done to them
that they do not want, but in that (rather extreme) case their moral beliefs
and their wants will coincide by deﬁnition. They will deem themselves
wronged whenever someone interferes in a way they do not want.
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V. IMMUNITY VS. IMPUNITY
In the previous section I have argued that we should focus on a
persons moral beliefs or ideas, rather than his avowable interests
if we analyse non-domination from the point of view of indi-
vidual dignity. There is a second aspect of the notion of non-
domination that requires closer scrutiny, however: the precise
meaning of being forced to track these ideas. I do not address
the issue of what exactly constitutes tracking, but rather focus on
how we should interpret this notion of being forced to do so.
There are at least two ways in which we can take this notion,
both of which can be supported by excerpts from republican
writings. The ﬁrst interpretation focuses on the fact that domi-
nation is ﬁrst and foremost a power relation, so any problems
resulting from it can be resolved by taking away the dominators
ability to interfere. Some republican texts do suggest this inter-
pretation, as they claim that what is demeaning about domina-
tion is that one is subjected to the will of another (see e.g. Pettit
2002, Skinner 1998). This interpretation is problematic, though,
as it is hard to conceive of the mere fact that someone can choose
to interfere with you if she forms a determined will to do so as a
demeaning form of vulnerability. There is little demeaning, for
instance, about the fact that the group of friendly youths outside
my oﬃce building could, if they were truly determined to do so,
decide to stop me from leaving the building. Clearly, making all
such possible interferences truly impossible even if people form
determined wills to perform them would require draconian
measures that would restrict social interaction beyond all viable
limits, since social life is full of such possibilities (cf. Carter 1999;
Kramer 2003). If this is how we were to interpret the power to
interfere arbitrarily, the republican ideal of freedom as non-
domination would become the freedom of the paranoid. Anyone
who could possibly be out to get you – and to the truly paranoid
that means everyone – must have their ability to interfere with
you removed. This is therefore not, I take it, how we should
interpret the notion of non-domination, and there are clear
indications in republican texts that what they have in mind is
indeed something less radical. What makes being at the mercy of
someone elses will problematic is not so much the fact that,
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should she truly decide to interfere with you she would succeed,
but that she would be able to do so with impunity (see e.g. Pettit
1997, p. 58, 93; 2001a, p. 79; Skinner 1998, p. 72).
Interpreting non-domination in this fashion, we emphasise
the importance of arbitrariness, rather than emphasising the
power or ability element in the deﬁnition of non-domination.
To have a power to interfere arbitrarily is to be able to interfere
with impunity. This, however, has implications, especially for
the function of the criminal justice system and the role of penal
law. To be able to do something with impunity is to be able to
do something without being punished for doing it. To ensure
that someone cannot do something with impunity one would
either have to make sure she cannot do it (incapacitation),
which, as argued above is as a general approach unfeasible, or
ensure that if she does transgress, she will subsequently be
punished for it. Punishment can only follow a crime that has
been committed, however, and this ex post nature of punish-
ment has an important, often overlooked and possibly at ﬁrst
sight counterintuitive implication about when an interfering act
constitutes an act of domination. In an important way, the
notion of non-domination thus conceived allows us to deter-
mine the past. As an interfering act is only an instance of
domination if it is done with impunity (i.e. remains unpun-
ished), we get to decide at a time t+ whether a transgression
against a person committed at time t is to be an act of domi-
nation by deciding whether or not to punish the perpetrator.11
If we fail to punish him, then he interfered with impunity,
which makes his act an act of domination, whereas if we do
punish him, then clearly he did not do it with impunity.
This, however, has a further implication, which is striking
because it directly contradicts Pettits own expressed view of
republican sentencing policy. Braithwaite and Pettit (1990),12
who as avowed consequentialists dismiss deontic considerations,
11 For more on the possibility of changing the nature of past acts see
Peijnenburg (2007).
12 It is worth noting that though the notion of impunity plays an
important role in Pettits later work, Braithwaite and Pettit (1990) hardly
mentions the notion at all, and when it is mentioned (p. 118), it is discussed
dismissively.
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explicitly reject the principle that all those found guilty of a crime
should be punished in accordance with the severity of the crime
(i.e. not below and not above a certain level) – this principle is
known as the retributivist principle or the principle of just
deserts. Braithwaite and Pettit agree with the retributivists that a
person may not be punished above the level that his crime war-
rants, but claim the position that he should not be punished any
less lacks all grounds and that the notion of just deserts is
therefore inherently ﬂawed. Instead, Braithwaite and Pettit
favour a presumption of parsimony, claiming that the costs of
punishment are vast and the beneﬁts in terms of non-domination
are almost always of a distant and probabilistic character
(p. 87). The argument above, however, shows that we can use the
republican principle of non-domination as an underpinning of
the retributivist position that those found guilty of a crime need
to be punished, at least when the victim so demands, and not
below a certain level. Under the impunity interpretation of non-
domination, crimes as such do not constitute acts of domination:
only unpunished ones do. Because punishment immediately
prevents a past transgression from becoming an act of domina-
tion, the beneﬁts of punishing the perpetrator are neither distant,
nor particularly probabilistic, which refutes, at the very least, the
presumption of parsimony.13
13 If and how the three principles for punishment Braithwaite and Pettit
advocate (recognition of the wrong done to the victim, recompense and
reassurance), can be reconciled with the retributive principle in a coherent
theory of punishment requires more detailed analysis than is possible here. It
is important to mention, however, that none of the principles advocated by
Braithwaite and Pettit strictly qualify as punishment (cf. Duﬀ and Marshall
2006, p. 71), and hence that they do not directly aﬀect the impunity of the
transgression. My main aim is to argue that there is room and need for the
retributive principle of punishment within a republican theory of punishment
designed to ensure non-domination, and thus that the presumption of par-
simonymust be replaced by a presumption of punishing the guilty. This leaves
open the possibility that there may be particular situations in which the
indirect, mostly forward-looking, eﬀects of the principles advocated by
Braithwaite and Pettit outweigh the direct eﬀects on (non-)domination of
punishment. This, however, will need to be shown on a case by case basis. The
direct eﬀects of punishment on the non-domination of a victim of a trans-
gression are suﬃcient to put the burden of proof on those who wish to refrain
from punishing the perpetrator in accordance with the severity of the crime.
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It is important to stress that this argument in favour of
retributivism is different from the notions of retributivism
discussed and rejected by Braithwaite and Pettit, as the
emphasis is much more on the dignity of the victim. In the
retributivist account to which Pettit and Braithwaite are most
sympathetic, that of Jean Hampton (Murphy and Hampton
1988), the perpetrators crime is viewed as an assertion of
superiority over the victim. In her view, retribution is then
called for to refute this claim by the perpetrator and re-establish
their equal footing. Pettit and Braithwaite have some sympathy
for this view but point out that it is hard to interpret all crimes,
especially relatively minor ones, as claims to superiority over
the victim. This may be true, but even if it is unlikely that a
minor crime like petty theft is a claim to superiority – I indeed
seriously doubt that perpetrators think of their actions in such a
way – it nonetheless does constitute a denial of the status of the
victim as a person whose rights and dominion are to be
respected. In general, such intrusions will be much less in cases
which aﬀect a persons property like theft than they will be in
cases where grave violence is involved which directly harms his
physical person (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, p. 102); but as any
victim of theft can tell you, being treated in such a way is
personal (even if, or perhaps especially when, the perpetrator
does not see it as such). The republican argument for retributive
justice from dignity does not, however, need to regard the
oﬀence by the perpetrator as a claim to superiority. All it needs
is that a crime constitutes an infringement of the status and
personal sphere of the victim, and this is clearly the case.
Almost any crime for which the victim deems it necessary to
address the criminal justice system will involve a personal injury
to the victim, part of which is the legitimate feeling of being
wronged and therefore oﬀended. It may be true that thieves and
burglars generally do not think of their victims at all, but this
does not mean that such neglect does not constitute a signiﬁ-
cant personal aﬀront to the victim. One can quite appropriately
take oﬀence at an interfering act that does not have causing
oﬀence as its motivation (cf. Duﬀ and Marshall 2006). By
punishing the perpetrator, society cannot take away this injury,
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as it is a personal matter between the perpetrator and her vic-
tim. It can, however, ensure that it does not add insult to injury
by failing to prevent this oﬀence from being an instance of
domination by ensuring it was not done with impunity.14
VI. DISCUSSION
For any political theory one of the most difﬁcult questions is
how to deal with persistent moral disagreement. Republicanism
is no different in this regard. In fact, the notion of non-domi-
nation places this disagreement at the forefront and, by making
it so prominent, it offers important insights that help us analyse
and address such issues. The notion of non-domination focuses
on a persons moral beliefs as they are,15 which means that even
the views of people who hold rather eccentric or even objec-
tionable moral beliefs are recognised as relevant purely because
they are held by those persons. To respect people as moral
agents is to hold that their moral beliefs are relevant, whatever
they may be. Of course, this greatly complicates matters.
Developing a political theory is much easier if one were, for
instance, to restrict the analysis to those moral beliefs which are
deemed reasonable, rational or in some other way acceptable.
Such approaches, though, depend on some predetermined
standard of acceptability, rationality or reasonability and the
existence of moral disagreement can itself be a sign of the ab-
sence of consensus about such a standard. Moreover, such an
approach cannot but be extremely disrespectful of those who
hold views that deviate from it. It is one thing to tell a person
his moral beliefs are ﬂawed – after all, since human beings are
ﬂawed beings, it is more than likely that we all hold at least
some moral beliefs that are ﬂawed in some way – but to say that
14 It is important to stress that punishment does not have a restorative
function in this account. Retribution is called for in this account because it
prevents a speciﬁc injury to the victim (that of being dominated), it does not
undo it.
15 Though making moral judgments is clearly a normative endeavour,
what a persons moral beliefs are, is a matter of empirical, objective fact.
Whether such beliefs are tracked, or whether a person judges himself
wronged are therefore also purely empirical matters that in principle allows
for a completely non-normative description.
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his moral beliefs are not even worthy of consideration is a
matter of quite a diﬀerent order. If you tell a person his moral
beliefs, especially those directly concerning his person, do not
even warrant consideration, you cannot maintain that you truly
take him seriously as a full moral agent.
Republican writers have offered important methods that
help deal with such conﬂicts. One of these is Pettits notion of
contestability. If each person has the ability to contest an
intrusion into his affairs before some suitably reliable court of
appeal,16 this will greatly limit his vulnerability to possible
intruders. By calling an intruder to account before such a court,
people can ensure that any wrongful interference in their aﬀairs
will cease (and, if necessary, that the perpetrator will be pun-
ished for his wrongful treatment, as argued in the previous
section). However, although the ability to take those who
transgress against you to court is important, it must be stressed
that in many cases such a step is to be taken only as a last
resort. It is important to your dignity to know that you have
this ﬁnal resort at your disposal, but conﬂicts should preferably
be resolved by other means. One of the most obvious ways to
deal with an oﬀending intruder is simply to confront her,
explain that her interference is wrongful to you, and demand
that she desist (see, e.g., Duﬀ and Marshall 2006, p. 68). Non-
domination is self-enforcing in this regard: if you are non-
dominated, you can aﬀord to stand up for yourself, because
you know that there is no other area of your aﬀairs in which she
can retaliate for your having had the audacity to confront her.
Thus, if one is non-dominated, one has discursive control
(Pettit 2001a), and having discursive control enables one to
resist further intrusions. However, demanding that someone
ceases her interference by no means ensures that she will do so.
Discursive control enables a person to take the ﬁrst step in
16 Pettit discusses contestability primarily in relation to state intrusions
into the aﬀairs of citizens (Pettit 1997, pp. 183–198). There is no reason to
assume, however, that contestability is limited to state interference, and
similar institutions can be set up to deal with conﬂicts between individuals.
For ease of reference, I refer to such institutions here as courts of appeal,
but the degree to which such mediating or arbitral institutions will resemble
actual courts may vary greatly.
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successfully resisting wrongful interference in his aﬀairs, but it
leaves unexplained how discourse itself can then reduce such
interferences. In this case, interpreting non-domination in terms
of a persons moral beliefs has a clear advantage over the for-
mulation in terms of avowed interests. Discussion and
explanation may alter peoples beliefs and opinions about a
particular instance of interference, but such communicative
practices will quite often leave ones avowed interests unaf-
fected. In a serious discourse, both parties must have the ability
to convince the other side (Crocker 1980, p. 79). The cessation
of the interference is one possible outcome, but this is not the
only way in which an aﬀront can be prevented (cf. Husak 2006,
p. 94). If you show me, for instance, that although it has some
adverse aﬀect on me, your interfering act was nonetheless your
choice to make, or that it was necessary for the sake of others,
you may succeed in lifting my moral objections to it and
thereby relieve the oﬀence. After all, like most people I am quite
aware that my interests are hardly always of overriding con-
cern; my status as a moral being that has to be treated correctly,
however, has a much stronger claim to such inviolability.
Contestability and discourse are two important means for
removing or reducing domination, but it is also clear that they
cannot resolve all problems. As is well known, even after
extensive discourse, people will quite often still disagree about
the acceptability of a given action. Contestability, too, has its
limits. Not every one will always be able to accept the verdict of
the court of appeal where the contestation was adjudged.
Nonetheless, it must be admitted that such courts can often
reduce affront. If people are convinced of the integrity and
authority of the court, they often accept the verdict even if it
goes against them (Pettit 1997, pp. 198–199). The degree to
which contestability can serve its function of reducing domi-
nation and aﬀront depends very much on the level of congru-
ence of the basic moral beliefs within a society. If such beliefs
are fundamentally split on, for instance, the basic notions of
fairness and legitimacy, it will become impossible to create a
court (or court procedure) that is acceptable to all. If your
views on how one may be treated by others diﬀer radically from
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those of the bulk of society, for instance, contestability loses its
function. If you know beforehand that the court of appeal does
not share your views on respectful treatment (suppose, for in-
stance, that you are a radical feminist and the courts are based
on a fundamentalist interpretation of religious law), there is
little point in going there to contest an instance of interference.
The republican notion of dignity is not an ideal that is fully
realisable in the sense that we can ever create a situation or
state in which people are never vulnerable to any intrusion they
deem wrongful to their person without having access to ade-
quate means of redress, but this does not mean it is not a notion
that should be furthered as much as possible. Furthermore,
even in those cases where such a vulnerability cannot be avoi-
ded, it is still better to be aware of this unfortunate fact and to
admit the injury this implies than to be blind to it or deny it
altogether. Non-domination is not the cure for all evils, but it
clearly points to an important aspect of what it means to take
people serious as moral agents.
Somemay object to this on the grounds that it seems to call for
especially solicitous treatment of people who hold repugnant
moral beliefs such as racists and bigots. To a racist, being treated
as an equal to those he feels superior to is clearly an insult (let
alone if they were to hold political ofﬁce, for instance), but that
does not seem to entitle him to any special consideration at all, as
that would be incompatible with the dignity of those he deems
inferior. However, this does not refute the account above. First
of all, there is no problem with claiming that the bigot who is
forced to treat those he deems inferior as equals, or live under
their rule if they are democratically elected, is thereby humili-
ated. This humiliation is undoubtedly justiﬁed, but that does not
make it any less humiliating to the bigot. More importantly, it
shows that individual dignity is not an absolute value in the sense
that it can never be justiﬁably intruded on (this is not incom-
patible, however, with the position that it is an absolute value in
the sense that it can only justiﬁably be curtailed for the sake of
dignity itself – especially that of others (cf. Hill 1992)).
Finally, some further comments must be made on the
argument in favour of retributivism. In section V I argued that
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retributive punishment is vital to the dignity of the victim. This
may seem very unappealing to some, as it may appear that it
calls for the sacriﬁce of one person so that the anger and desire
for vengeance of the other may be satisﬁed. Clearly it is not a
good idea to eﬀectively hand over perpetrators to their victims
for punishment. This would be likely to lead to excessive and
cruel forms of punishment. However, this is not what the ret-
ributivist argument for punishment amounts to, and there are a
number of elements in the notion of retribution that make clear
that retributivism takes full account of the dignity and status of
the perpetrator as a moral being. First, acknowledgment of the
status of the perpetrator as a moral being is assured by the very
fact that retribution is called for because of the oﬀence to the
dignity of the victim. As only other persons or moral beings can
cause oﬀence or become dominators, the perpetrator has to be
regarded as a moral being right from the start. Furthermore,
the very fact that the question of appropriate punishment
comes up at all also implies that the perpetrator is regarded as a
moral being. If she were not, we would simply treat her the way
we would treat, for instance, animals who have been shown to
pose a danger to persons (which treatment tends to be rather
short, swift and sometimes brutal). Most importantly, however,
it should be stressed that the level of punishment demanded by
a persons moral beliefs must be separated from his desire for
vengeance, or his anger. If the state ever catches the miscreant
who violated the sanctity of my dwelling, my understandable
desire for vengeance may well demand he be subjected to a host
of most imaginative forms of punishment, but my notion of just
and adequate punishment will go against such excessive vio-
lence and be satisﬁed much sooner. Moreover, the notion of
republican dignity requires only that the aggressor has no
power to interfere with impunity in the aﬀairs of another. It
does not require that punishment comes about solely at the
hands of the victim.17 Ensuring republican dignity therefore
does not demand that the victim gets to act out all his desires
for revenge on the perpetrator. But it should be stressed that if
17 See also Pettits endorsement of the importance of passive empower-
ment (Pettit 2001b).
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the victim feels the punishment is excessively mild, amounting
to little more than the proverbial slap on the wrist, he may
legitimately take this as an insult by the state. If the punishment
cannot be accepted as ﬁtting by the victim, he may well regard
the transgression as an act of (partial) domination, and doubt
whether the state really takes him and his status as a full moral
person seriously.18 Punishment thus serves as an important
communicative tool, but not primarily to the perpetrator that
what she did was wrong, but to the victim (and other members
of society) that no-one gets to treat him that way with impunity
and thus that he is indeed a non-dominated member of society
with full standing.19
18 This also explains why impunity can only be prevented by the state
showing itself willing and able to inﬂict punishment on an oﬀender. If, for
instance, a state were to declare certain intrusions into the aﬀairs of others
illegal but subsequently fail to enforce these laws, this will do little to em-
power the dominated person and reduce his demeaning vulnerability – in
fact, the lack of commitment to the dignity of the individual that such a
callous attitude by the state expresses will oftentimes make the aﬀront
caused by such intrusions worse (cf. Roberts 2006, p. 44). An important
further implication is that there is limited room in republican sentencing for
mercy. If a judge or jury were to apply mercy (deﬁned as punishing someone
less than her crime warrants) in sentencing the perpetrator, the punishment
will no longer suﬃce (assuming the victim deems the ultimate punishment
too low) to prevent the intruding act from constituting an act of (partial)
domination. By being merciful to the perpetrator the judge or jury com-
municates to the victim and all other members of society that he is not a
member of full standing. Hence, if mercy is to have any place in a republican
sentencing policy, the power to grant it must be placed solely in the hands of
the victim, as the lower bound on the level of punishment is intimately
connected to his dignity and standing. Only in this way is mercy possible
without disempowering the victim. A potential drawback to giving the
victim the power to bestow or withhold mercy, however, is that it arguably
undermines the principle that like cases must be treated alike – whether it
truly does so, or whether it really is to be regarded as a genuine problem if it
does, is a question that unfortunately cannot be addressed here.
19 In fact we see this response in many emotional court cases. Victims
who feel the perpetrator is adequately punished do not thereby feel any
happier (often their attitude rather seems to be one of sad relief), but those
who feel the perpetrator is inadequately punished are often most indignant
and oﬀended by the courts ruling, taking it as a personal insult.
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Themain objection Pettit and Braithwaite have to accounts of
retributive justice is that they fail to provide a convincing reason
both for why punishment is called for and why it should be
proportional to the severity of the crime. I hope I have shown,
however, that the very republican notion of non-domination,
when analysed in its relation to the dignity and status of a person
as a full moral being amongst others, provides an answer to both
questions. By demanding an appropriate level of punishment,
retributive justice acknowledges the dignity of both the victim
and the perpetrator. The former sets a lower limit to the pun-
ishment that may be inﬂicted, whereas the latter sets an upper
one. Perhaps retributive justice does assume without argument
that these lower and upper limits are compatible, and I havent
given an account of how to measure the severity of an intrusion,
but I do hope to have shown that it is possible to make sense of
the notion of just deserts and that the retributivist principle has
a vital role to play in a republican theory that seeks to ensure the
dignity of citizens through the notion of non-domination.
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